Islamabad, Pakistan – Eleven days after the gunmen They shot 26 people In the stunning scenery valley in Paalgam, India and Pakistan stand on the brink of military confrontation.
Both nuclear armed neighbors announced a series of steps that reach the other against the other since the attack on April 22, which blamed Pakistan, even that Islamabad denied any role in the killings.
India has suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty, which imposes a water -sharing mechanism on which Pakistan is dependent. Pakistan has threatened to stay away from the Simla agreement in 1972, which adhered to the two countries to get to know the previous ceasefire line as a control line (LOC)-an ineffective border-between them in Kashmir, a disputed area on which they partially control, but they completely claim both. Both countries also expelled each other and their diplomatic duties have volumes.
Although there is a ceasefire agreement Since 2021The current escalation is the most dangerous since 2019, when India Air strikes were launched On the Pakistani soil, after an attack on the Indian soldiers in Poloama, in the Indian runway, who killed 40 soldiers. In recent days, they have Circulation Via LOC.
The region is now ready, amid increasing expectations that India may launch a military operation against Pakistan this time as well.
However, the two countries also participated in their diplomatic partners. On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called on Pakistani Prime Minister Shibaz Sharif and Indian Foreign Minister S. On Thursday, US Defense Minister Beit Higseth described his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh, to condemn the attack and offered “strong support” to India.
Sharif met with envoys from China, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, three of Pakistan’s nearest allies, to request their support, and urged the two countries’ ambassadors of cells to “influence India to cancel the escalation and defuse the tensions.”
To understand how the Pakistani strategies who worked on relations with India are looking at what might happen after that, the island spoke with MoEed Yusuf, who held the position of Pakistani National Security Adviser (NSA) between May 2021 and April 2022 Under former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Before his role as NSA, Youssef also worked as a special advisor to Khan in matters related to national security that begins in December 2019, four months after the Indian government, during the era of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Special status From Kashmir, the Indian director.

His headquarters in Lahore, Youssef is currently the Vice President of a private university and has composed and edited many books on South Asia and regional security. His latest book, peace in nuclear environments, was published: American Crisis Management in South Asia, in 2018.
Al -Jazeera: How do you evaluate the moves that both sides have taken so far in the crisis?
Med Youssef: India and Pakistan have been struggled for a long time in terms of crisis management. They do not have the mechanism of managing bilateral crisis, which is the primary concern.
The first crises management tool that the two sides used was to rely on third parties, where the idea is that they will try to curb them from both and help cancel the crisis.
This time, I feel that the problem that India faced is that it followed the old playing book, but the most important third party leader, the United States, did not appear to support India.
They seem to have so far taken a neutral and position, as President Donald Trump pointed out a few days ago. (Trump said he knows the leaders of India and Pakistan, and he believes they can solve the crisis alone.)
Pakistan’s response is directly related to the Indian response, and this is what it was historically, as both countries go with each other. This time, too, a number of punitive steps have been announced.
The problem is that it is easy to run the movement but it is very difficult to reverse it, even when things improve, and they may want to do so.
Unfortunately, in every crisis between them, the revenge steps have become more and more, as in this case, India decided to keep it Water bond treaty In the absence of illegal because the treaty does not provide any such judgment.
Al -Jazeera: Do you think that the strike is imminent and if the two sides refer to the preparation for confrontation?
Yusef: In such moments, it is impossible to say. Work from India is still reasonable and possible, but the window where the consultant was a real concern.
What usually happens in crises is that the states capture the movements or logistics, or that their allies inform them, or depend on ground intelligence to determine what may happen. Sometimes, these things can be wrong and can lead the offensive side to see an opportunity to act as no one or the defensive side of the belief that the attack may come when it is not so.
Pakistan, of course, must show the commitment to prepare for any possibility. You don’t know what will happen next, so you have to be ready.
After saying this, I don’t think we will see a big war, but in these circumstances, you can never predict, and misunderstanding or miscalculation can lead to a big thing.
Al -Jazeera: How do you see the role of third parties such as the United States, China and the Gulf in this crisis, and how do you compare it with previous cases?
Yusef: My last book, the mediation of peace (2018) was in the field of third -party management in the context of Pakistan, India, and this is a vital element for both, as they built it at the expense of their differentiation and integration until a third party comes.
The idea is that a third party’s mediator will intervene, and the two countries will agree to stop because this is what they really want, rather than escalating more.
The leader of the third -party package is the United States since the 1999 Kargil War. (The Pakistani forces crossed to try to control the strategic highlands in Kargil in Ladakh, but India eventually managed to restore the region.
Anyone else, including China, eventually supports the position of the United States, which gives priority to immediate ending above all during the crisis.
This has changed somewhat in the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Polama Crisis when the United States has sharply bowed on the side of India, and may not inadvertently encourage them to behave in 2019.
(In 2016, the Indian forces launched a “surgical blow” across the border. New Delhi said that the targeted armed fighters were planning to attack India, after the militants killed 19 Indian soldiers in an attack on an army base in Uri, Kashmeer, after three years, New Delhi bombed what the “terrorists” said in Balakt, in Bakast, Khayght Khaistan Kyhybakt Khayhistat Khayhistan Khayhistan Chyhistan Chyhistan Khayhastan Khayhast.
However, this time, you have a White House president who turned and told both Pakistan and India to discover themselves.
I think this has harmed India more than Pakistan, because they have deduced great support for the United States in recent years, believing that they have been close to India because of their strategic relationship.
But India was hoping that the Americans would put their foot and pressure on Pakistan, which was not exactly. It is the call of Foreign Minister Marco Rubio again the one that begins in the middle, as they tell each of the two countries to get out of the war.
So, what they did, strange enough, is still playing a role in restoring India until now, because India has not (yet) the courage to take action as it might be during Polama in 2019.
The Gulf states played a more active role than before. China, also, made a statement of restraint.

Al -Jazeera: How has Pakistan’s relationship to India evolved in recent years?
Yusef: There was a sea change in the relationship between the two countries. When I was in office, despite the serious problems and unilateral moves in India in Kashmir in 2019, we saw a ceasefire agreement on the control line as well as the back channel talks.
We have tried to move forward and reduce the incentive of India to destabilize Pakistan, but I believe that India has lost this opportunity because of its stubbornness, arrogance and ideological curvature that still forces them to threaten Pakistan.
This has also led to a change in Pakistan, as driving is now convinced that the policy of restraint has not been submitted, and India has misused Pakistan’s offers and abuse for dialogue.
The opinion now is that if India does not want to speak, then Pakistan should not beg. If India continues, we will likely respond, but there is no despair in Pakistan at all.
This is not a good place to be any of the countries. I have long believed and argued that Pakistan in the end to reach where we want to go economically, India to reach where she says she wants to go at the regional level, cannot happen unless their relationship has not improved. Currently, with the current Indian position, unfortunately, I don’t see little hope.
Al -Jazeera: Do you expect any direct talks in India at any level during or after this crisis?
Yes – I do not know when it will be, or who will be through it or with it, but I believe that one of the main lessons that the Indians can stay away from as soon as all this ends is that an attempt to isolate Pakistan does not work.
The water bond treaty in the paternity? Simla Agreement A possible comment? These are major decisions, and the countries will need to speak to sorting this, and I think it is at some point in the future they will participate.
But I also don’t think that Pakistan will move towards rapprochement, as we have often made opportunities for dialogues recently to no avail. As I said, the mood in Pakistan was also affected by this question.
In the end, the Indians need to determine whether or not they want to speak. If they go out, I think Pakistan will continue to respond positively to it.
*This interview was released for clarity and brevity.
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