The Trump Putin Alaska summit aims to divide Russia from the Chinese coalition

The main headlines say the Alaska summit between President Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin It was about Ukraine. Commentators in Brussels and Washington are trained in familiar discussions: Was Trump very soft on Moscow? Is Kyiv undermining?

But this framework lacks the biggest picture.

The Trump administration has already set the terms of the twenty -first century competition: The United States faces the largest long -term threat not from Russia, but from China. One of the comprehensive sanctions on Beijing to advanced artificial intelligence chips, to US security guarantees circulating to align in the Middle East and India to the Pacific Ocean, Trump has constantly organized an foreign policy on China’s height. On this background, his communication in Russia is not a distraction. It is a deliberate attempt to bring cohesion to America’s first strategy-which is attending it against the old global consensus that is now clinging to the European Union’s agenda-Ukraine.

China’s meetings, Trump Putin, West’s torque standards on Ukraine

For Europe, the war was depicted in Ukraine as the “confrontation line for democracy.” Brussels, with the support of Kyiv, presses an unlimited confrontation with Russia: the maximum sanctions, deeper obligations of NATO, and the permanent integration of Ukraine in the Western system. It is a noble vision, but it comes at the expense of America. NATO expansion expands US defense guarantees. Demographic and economic collapse in Ukraine makes full regional restoration unlikely, leaving Washington with an open responsibility. Economically, Europe – not the United States – is the one that carries the power and disrupted trade after 2022. At the same time, America has benefited from liquefied natural gas exports and is still relatively isolated. What Brussels is looking for is clear: to lock the United States more deeply in continental affairs as a guarantor in the end, even if it distracts Washington’s attention from the theater that will determine the century.

Gambit moves in Russia in the opposite direction. It is not related to leniency but from realism, which is in line with the first China’s doctrine. Russia today is the weak link in Beijing’s strategy. Moscow’s dependence on Chinese capital, markets and diplomatic cover has grown significantly. Beijing took advantage of this financial lever to extract highly declining discounts on Russian oil, tightening the yuan trade, and securing Moscow’s alignment with its geopolitical positions. I left unanswered, that “Eurosian Entente” closes America in the confrontation with two nuclear peers simultaneously.

Trump’s goal is to rush the axis. His tools are transactions but clear. On the economic side, it hinted at the energy holes, charging in the Arctic, and critical minerals that reduce Russia’s dependence on Beijing while creating potential supply chain chain opportunities for the American industry. On the military side, he carefully skipped Audrene Aid – patriots, radils, hawks – enough to hold the line, but not an empty examination that drains American stocks or risks direct escalation. On diplomacy, the police carrots associated with a solid stick: all relief is linked to the verified Russian steps-the ceasefire, the removal of the escalation, and the distance from Beijing-with Snapback sanctions in the reserve.

This strategy is in line with everything else that the Trump administration has done. Washington has already cut China from the most advanced semiconductors, banned Beijing to the resources of cloud computers that operate its laboratories, and sought to restructure rare land supply chains through the Allies from Australia to Africa. In the Middle East, Trump exchanged US security guarantees to align oil and technology, explicitly framed as part of the China competition. In Asia, the foundation rights in the Philippines Ghul, cited the Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. In this context, his communication in Russia is not a departure, but a continuation of the same design.

For Putin, the Alaska summit comes in a moment of strength and weakness. Moscow got modest gains in Ukraine and saw oil revenues climbing by 17 % year on an annual basis in early 2025. But it faces financial pressure. Requesting the priority is to re -enter the Swift system, starting with Rosselkhozbank. Meanwhile, Trump doubled the customs tariff on Indian goods to 50 %, expressing the explicit purchases of Russian oil in India, and threatened the sanctions of up to 100 % on any country that buys the reduced Russian crude – a warning directly targeting China. Moscow knows this is a serious leverage: Washington can press Russian revenues not only by preventing exports but by imposing deeper discounts through third parties.

This is where the opportunity lies. If Trump is able to direct Russia to transaction deals – limited energy, northern pole, and metal cooperation – while Moscow exfoliates even far from Beijing, America is gaining strategic space. By reducing excessive United States in Europe, it liberates resources for India and the Pacific, where the results of the century will be determined.

This is the real option for America. The first option is to follow the text of the European Union-Ukraine-permanent sanctions, endless expansion in NATO, and an open confrontation that serves the European agenda while attracting our attention. The second is the realistic path of Trump-Wieis confidence, not recovery, but the cold leverage: using Russia’s weakness to break the China League, and to ensure that America faces a great challenge, not two.

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The marina, then, was not a privilege. It was about cohesion. Trump has already reformulated the US foreign policy on the China Challenge. Russia’s play is part of the same framework. It is better to understand the Alaska meeting is not a betrayal of Ukraine or a gift for Putin, but as a strategic factor to reshape the board of directors so that the United States can fight – and win – the competition that really concerns.

TANVI Ratna is an analyst and policy engineer with a contract of experience in statecraft at the intersection of political geography, economy and technology. I worked at Capitol Hill, in EY, in Coindsk and others, to form policy across sectors from manufacturing to artificial intelligence. Follow it on Atatecraft x and Alternative.