The risks of war with Iran

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Going to war is always gambling. Iran, Israel, and now the United States has drew all the dice.

In the short term, Israel’s gambling appears to have succeeded. The Benjamin Netanyahu government managed to kill many of Iran’s military leadership and severe damage to the country’s nuclear and military infrastructure. Israel has also succeeded in its clear goal in attracting the United States to the battle.

Donald Trump’s decision to join the conflict, partly, was a reaction to early Israeli successes. The American president is always keen to look like a winner, and in the wake of American bombing raids on Iran, he has claimed “amazing military success.”

On the contrary, the Iranian government’s gambling that can lead the “resistance axis” of Israel – while avoiding the open confrontation – failed badly. For decades, Iran has skillfully developed its interests across the region, by caring for agents such as Hizballah, Hamas and Houthis, while working on its nuclear program.

For many years, the Iranian strategy seemed hidden and effective. In the Gulf states, it was common that four Arab capitals-Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus and Sana (in Yemen)-controlled by the forces supporting Iran. Iran was also close to the ability to develop a nuclear weapon.

But this long -term strategy is now in war. The Assad regime has fallen into Syria, and Israel has been seriously affected by Israel. Now the Iranian regime itself is subjected to direct attack.

However, the medium and long -term consequences for this war are less clear. Israel will struggle to convert short-term tactical successes-regardless of amazing extent-into long-term security. The United States has a long and bitter experience to see the initial military victories that turn into countless grinding wars. Iranian theocratic is subject to unprecedented attack. But bombing campaigns rarely lead to a system change. So the system can cling to and live to fight on another day.

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khawni, and the remainder of his army is now facing a list of options in depth. Emotionally, they will want to return. But Trump promised that Iranian revenge would lead to more intense American attacks.

For the sake of its survival, you may choose to drive in Tehran minimal revenge and then reach the diplomatic option. But the Iranians will also be afraid that, as the new American conservatives love to say, “Weakness is provocative.” Failure to respond can call for further attacks by Israel, as well as encouraging Iran’s local enemies.

Tehran will also know that Trump made a decision to bomb the background of deep concerns from his supporters – who are afraid that the United States would enter “a war forever.” If Iran strikes American goals in the Middle East – or the price of oil is imposed by closing the Strait of Hormuz – those concerns and divisions within America will increase. Trump’s first reaction will be revenge. But it is volatile and can reverse himself in a moment, especially when he is under local political pressure.

It is also known that the United States withdraws from the tangle of the Middle East in the face of severe losses. The 1983 US marine barracks bombing in Beirut, which is widely nodded by Hezbollah, cost the lives of 241 Americans – and led to an American decision to withdraw from Lebanon, rather than escalate.

Memories such as those confirming the risks to Trump. The only final result that would allow the United States to claim the “mission that has been accomplished” with credibility if Iran is completely dismantling its nuclear program, and if the current Iranian regime is replaced in one way or another with a stable and environmentally supportive government, with no desire to conflict with the United States or Israel.

These results seem very likely. The alternatives are more likely to be more wounded but still hostile – which can return to unexpected ways. The second possibility is the collapse of the current regime, followed by the civil conflict – which may attract strangers or allow terrorists to establish safe havens. Any of these results would risk attracting the United States to another Middle Eastern war, including the commitment of the ground forces.

The uncertainty about Iran’s options and the power of survival in America confirms the fragile nature of Israel’s current successes. The Netanyahu government is currently working on multiple fronts – in Gaza and Iran, and to a lesser extent, in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and on the occupied West Bank. It has no clear vision to end any of these conflicts.

Israel has made a long way to establish itself as a superpower for the Middle East. It has nuclear weapons (undeclared) and supporting the United States. However, in the long run, a country with a population of 10 million people cannot dominate an area with a population of several hundred million.

Israel also bears great risks with its relationship to the United States. Its brutal war in Gaza was severely damaged with the Democrats. If the Netanyahu government is now blamed for the United States to another war forever, the opposite American reaction against Israel may be from the two parties and the long.

In their various ways, Iran, Israel and the United States have gambling the war. The danger is that they will end up as losers.

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