It is time for us to treat rare land as a power. China is already doing

In April 2025, China imposed new export controls on seven rare ground elements and the permanent magnet from them – materials that form the basis of modern life and modern war. Fighter aircraft, missilesElectric cars, drones, wind turbines and even databases depend on high -performance magnets made of these critical metals. By restricting their flow, Beijing not only praised its industrial muscles, but also revealed America’s secretaries and the rest of the dangerous in the world. The latest work of China Show their willingness and ability to arm American and global accreditation.

This is not a new challenge. The United States has known more than 15 years ago that critical metal supply chains were very focused, very fragile, and were very leveled and chinese leverage and control. However, through democratic and republican administrations, we failed to respond with urgency or cohesion. Now, the consequences of these failures on the neck have acquired and followed up in our commercial and defensive sectors.

After the London talks, Washington and Beijing announced on Friday A new trade framework Accordingly, China will resume approval of export licenses for rare land during the next six months. American officials have publicly renewed the penetration – but they provided few details about what was provided in return. This leaves major questions without an answer: What are the American bodies? How will the deal be imposed? What happens when the six months end?

Doubts are high. Ford recently stopped production at its factory in Chicago due to a deficiency of magnet-which confirms that even short-term interruptions have real consequences. Paper agreements are not the supply chain solutions. Without transparency, timely approvals, long -term planning, this can easily become another diplomatic cycle for one step forward, two steps back.

Even this limited decline carries the risks. Dozens of companies were described in Europe and North America The export license process in China is very invasive -Call companies to send detailed production data, final use applications, facility photos, customer names and date of transactions. Some applicants have been rejected not to provide pictures or documents for their final users.

Executive officials say that the process amounts to “extracting official information.”

While companies are advised not to share sensitive IP, deleting the main details can mean unlimited delay. For companies in defensive supply chains, the effects of discomfort: a valuable commercial intelligence can be used to set competitors or disable advanced Chinese Chinese alternatives.

This is not just a license – it is a competitive monitoring. Until the United States adopts a safe and independent capacity through the critical mineral supply chain, it is still vulnerable to both disruption and data risk.

This weakness did not happen overnight. Many have been watching the slow train wreckage for years. In 2010, China cut rare land exports to Japan during a maritime conflict, a clear warning to the United States noted by the United States, but it was alienated. In 2014, the Obama administration won the World Trade Organization case against export restrictions in China, but it has mistakenly assumed that legal success would deter more manipulation.

What Trump did, Biden

The Trump administration has defined the rare land as critical but exempt from the China tariff for 2018, and perhaps an unannounced recognition of dependence on the United States. Biden has taken the most organized approach to now: Executive request 14017, critical metal working group, and IIJA and IRA financing. Strategic partnerships such as metal security partnership appeared. But progress was slow and disabled by allowing delay and unequal obligations.

The second Trump administration returned with more aggressive measures, summoning Article 232, activating the defense production law, and proposing the main financing reinforcements in the 2016 fiscal year. The National Energy Hegemony Council is now coordinating efforts. However, these measures, such as the postponement of China for a period of six months, are still lacked Beijing’s grip. It is important, the defense sector is still inverted, with an onwhelming window not available.

The last G7 summit in Canada emphasized global risks. European Commission President Ursula von der Lin China was accused directly of “arming” its control On the main materials like rare land, calling for the response of the G7 United. The result: a Critical metal action plan G7. Although China was not mentioned by name, the sub -text was unambiguous. The plan is committed to G7 members to raise the standards of Esg and Traceability for the main resources; Fill in capital for new projects in metal mining and processing; Cooperation in innovation in recycling, replacement and refining techniques.

As expected, Beijing’s reaction was angry. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the “excuse” plan, claiming that the Group of Seven was inciting the confrontation for fear of losing its share in the market.

Brussels now indicates that commercial negotiations with Beijing are effective, and therefore the chances of Chinese revenge – especially against the European Union – are rising. If China multiplies down, it risks the risk of pushing the European Union, Japan, South Korea and India more tightly in Washington’s orbit – exactly what Beijing hopes to avoid.

China’s dominant position in rare land mining

The raw numbers are amazing. China represents about 70 % of rare global land mining but more than 90 % of refining capacity. It produces 92 % of the noodimium-iron-iron magnet (NDFEB) in the world-used in everything from submarines to sootlas. This hegemony is not a coincidence. Chinese -backed treatment focuses on global acquisitions through the supply chain, and increases production much faster than the West can agree and issue permits for one mine.

US sites like MP materialsThe mountain corridor and an incomplete top round remains without treating the course of the river. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Energy have provided grants, and the TROMP FY2026 budget is looking to expand the ability of US mining and safe access to critical minerals. But all this is still existing by the Chinese start and industrial leadership for a long time.

China has moved early and sharply to Africa and Latin America, a partnership with governments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bolivia and Chile; Investing in ports, bars, and infrastructure refining. In contrast, American efforts and participation in these groups of issues were gradually and valuable, giving priority to transparency and governance, and really important issues, but they provide limited momentum of critical metal issues. Even the notes of modern chaos with Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are still symbolic, which were hindered by conflict and instability in those countries.

London conversations and progress in the last commercial deal bought time. But time without a strategy is not fruitful. The licensing system in China is still intact, and its data is unabated. The defense sector is still closed. Meanwhile, Congress threats to cancel clean energy and industrial policy can be attached to rare land projects exactly as they gain traction.

This is a decisive moment. China is betting that the internal divisions of America – between work, industry, environment, tribal states and political factions – will prevent this type of unified and continuous effort to compete. They may be right. The United States needs to prove that it is wrong.

Critical minerals are geopolitical power

The United States must now deal with critical minerals not as goods, but as tools for geopolitical power. China is already doing. Escape from its grip will require more than mine permits and financing in the short term. It requires a coherent and long -term strategy to build a full supply chain that does not only include local abilities but also trusted allies and partners. From mining and refining to magnet production and recycling, each link must be strengthened through the targeted investment, allowing reform, and strategic coordination.

A successful and sustainable policy requires a commitment from one presidency to the following. The United States cannot only bear the involvement of allies and partners with a letter. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chile and Indonesia (among other things) need sustainable and supportive partnerships of technology and critical infrastructure investments, and not only our lectures on governance.

Six months re-export is not a solution-it is a test of stress. It reveals whether the United States can finally focus and act, or whether it will back down again. Beijing is betting that it will be the last. Washington should respond urgently, unit and strategy equal to the size of the challenge. There is still time, but not much.

–by Diordrick McKenilManaging Director and Graduate Policy Analyst at LongView Global, CNBC shareholder