Iran’s threat will be chased for years

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The writer is the director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies

It is difficult to miss optimism and exile in Tel Aviv, Washington, not some Western capitals. The crushing of Iran’s power will provide stability and peace in the Middle East, and many love to believe. The American envoy Steve Whizov has announced that many countries that are still unknown will be normalized for relations with Israel soon, although these Arab countries. Some Israeli strategies have already suggested the “Abraham SHIELD”, which would gain Israeli domination and secure political and economic benefits without making any concessions related to the Palestinian state. Above all, Israel does not show any desire at the end of negotiation of the Gaza war.

In contrast, with the amazement of ruggedness and the feeling of dread that spread in the Gulf region, which just witnessed its fifth fire in five decades. After Iran’s Iraqi war in the 1980s, the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the invasion of the United States and the profession of Iraq in 2003 and its bloody effects and years of conflicts within the destroyed golf, there was hope that the agenda of global integration and regional prosperity would protect the region from turmoil. Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in May are carefully designed to make us participate in this vision.

Instead, despite all their efforts, Israel attacked Iran two weeks ago, followed by an American blow against Iranian nuclear facilities. It produced Iran’s revenge against an American base in Qatar, but a calibration and designer, which produced pictures of Qatari citizens and foreign workers who spray safety. The US -backed Qatari air defenses were well performed and there were no losses. But the shock to a country hosted the FIFA World Cup a few years ago and for neighbors who are proud of stability, safety and ease of work is unambiguous. The Gulf states must now plan for a long time of uncertainty and instability. From their point of view, the war was not decisive.

Regardless of the extent of damage to Iranian nuclear facilities, the coming years will be formed whether Tehran leaves the nuclear non -proliferation treaty, and whether Israel and the United States continue to bomb and whether the Iranians are building a preliminary nuclear device. What the Gulf states are once considers a threat that can be managed through a deal – Iran permanently without the nuclear threshold and with the inverted regional spread – has now become their stability for decades. This will keep the Gulf states and those who want to invest or live there.

All similes are incomplete and serve themselves, but looking at the following: Today is like Iraq in 1991. A military regime has survived, albeit in a weak form. She can no longer display strength and may have to tame its rebellious surroundings, but it can still disrupt its neighborhood. Local opposition forces and competition are weak. Its leaders still believe that changing the system is the non -teacher.

Unlike the 1990s, when the United States overwhelmed the global administration of Iraq and had a legal basis to do so, today America is not interested in such such as. After we have shown us more powerful power than any military procession, Trump does not have attention or focus on following a complex and sustainable settlement that is restricted at the same time and integrating Iran at the regional level. Even if it does, Israel will probably resist such a design because it will reduce freedom of work. Israel is primarily interested in working without obstacle wherever it fights. What matters is that its planes can fly at the will and their spies can work anywhere, and for enemies and partners to accept this without restriction or condition. The weak Iran will be very busy licking its wounds and settling the internal degrees of risk of high risk diplomacy except for purchase of time.

The edge of the nuclear abyss may have led to bad opposite results, but it remains a card that Tehran can play. He will also have to rethink the defense position. Determination and Israel failed through medium -range ballistic missiles and militias. Investing in the home defense is still expensive and more difficult: Russia has proven much lower than a friend in all weather conditions and will not give the priority of Iran’s needs. China is now vibrant as the best bet in Iran, but Beijing will learn from this struggle that the least exposure to the Middle East policy serves it better. The remaining tools in Iran’s arsenal are the most accurate and wilted short -term systems (missiles as well as drones) that are only useful within the Gulf region.

All this means that the Gulf states must now spend more time and attention in Iran’s administration. They are likely to search for better air defenses to suit the impressive Israel shield and more missiles for a reliable deterrence method. This guarantees permanent defense relations with Western countries. But despite the attack of both of them by Tehran in recent years, Doha and his leadership are more likely to show patience and the sun these days. There will be political data, visits and economic agreements – as well as greater criticism of the United States and Israel. Ironically, Israel’s success against Iran is already reduces the desire of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to normalize with Israel.

While discussions in Western capitals depict Iran as a consuming force, the country will continue to pose a threat to its neighbors and the center of talks across the Middle East for years to come.