India and Pakistan face the conflict again

The deadly gunman’s attack last week in Bahajam in the Indian director, Kashmir, who killed a civilian life, sparked a dark sense of the Dja Fu of the security forces and diplomats in India.

This is familiar land. In 2016, after 19 Indian soldiers were killed in UriIndia launched “surgical strikes” through the control line – the actual borders between India and Pakistan – targeting armed bases.

In 2019, and BombingThat left 40 Indian semi -military employees, pushed Air raids depth in cut – The first such action in Pakistan since 1971 – which sparked reprisals and air battle.

Before that, the horrific 2008 Mumbai attacks – The siege is firm for 60 hours in hotels, a railway station and a Jewish center – over 166 lives.

Each time, India has held the Pakistan -based armed groups in charge of attacks, accusing Islamabad of implicit support – a charge that Pakistan has constantly denied.

Since 2016, especially after the 2019 air strikes, the escalation threshold has turned significantly. Border and air strikes have become the new base, which sparked revenge on Pakistan. This has already intensified a volatile position.

Once again, experts say that India finds itself walking on a tight rope between escalation and self -control – a fragile balance in response and deterrence. One of the people who understand this repeated course is Ajay Bisaria, the former High Commissioner in India for Pakistan during the Polama attack, which seized its effects on his memoirs, and the management of anger: the turbulent diplomatic relationship between India and Pakistan.

On Thursday, 10 days after the last attack, Mr. Bisaria told me: “There are amazing similarities between the Polama bombing and murder in Bahajam.”

However, he notes, Paralgam It represents a transformation. Unlike Pulwama and URI, which targeted the security forces, this attack struck civilians – tourists from all over India – which raises memories of Mumbai attacks of 2008. “This attack carries elements of Poloama, but more than Mumbai,” explains.

“We are again in the conflict mode, and the story is revealed in the same way,” says Mr. Pesaria.

A week after the last attack, Delhi quickly moved with retaliatory measures: closing the main border crossing, the main water sharing treaty, expelling diplomats, and stopping most visas to Pakistani citizens – who gave days to leave. The forces on both sides exchanged the fires of small intermittent weapons across the border in recent days.

Delhi also prevented all Pakistani – commercial and military aircraft – from the airspace, reflecting the previous Islamabad step. Pakistan retreated by commenting on the visa and hung the peace treaty in 1972 with India. (Kashmir, which is demanded by both India and Pakistan, was managed in parts by each of them, was a flash point between the two nuclear armed countries since their division in 1947.)

In his notes, Mr. Bisaria tells the response of India after the Poloa attack on February 14, 2019.

He was called to Delhi the next morning, as the government moved quickly to stop trade – Cancel the most effective role in PakistanIn 1996, it was granted in the following days, the Cabin Security Committee (CCS) imposed a 200 % customs duty on Pakistani goods, actually ending imports, and hung trade on land borders in Wajah.

Mr. Bisaria notes that a broader set of measures has also been proposed to reduce participation with Pakistan, most of which were carried out later.

It included a cross -border train suspension known as Samjhauta Express, bus service linking Delhi and Lahore; The talks between the border guards are postponed on both sides and negotiations on history Kartarpur Corridor To one of the holiest sikh shrines, the visa was stopped, the cross borders stopped, the Indian travel ban to Pakistan, and the suspension of flights between the two countries.

“How difficult to build confidence, as I thought, and how it was easy to break,” Written by Mr. Bisaria.

“All planning and negotiating confidence -building measures over years in this difficult relationship can be reduced to a yellow note in minutes.”

The strength of the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad was reduced from 110 to 55 after Poloama. (It now stands at 30 after the Paalgam attack.) India also launched a diplomatic attack.

A day after the attack, Foreign Minister Vijay Jokali briefed on the envoys of 25 countries-including the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and France-about the role of the JEM army (JEM), the Pakistan-based armed group behind the bombing, and accused Pakistan using the terrorist as the state policy. Jim, which was appointed by a terrorist organization by India, the United Nations, the United Kingdom and the United States, was Responsibility claim For bombing.

The Indian diplomatic attack continued on February 25, 10 days after the attack, and pressed the president of JEM Masoud AzharAppointment as a terrorist by the United Nations sanctions committee and its inclusion in the “independent terrorist list” of the European Union.

While there was a pressure to the recitation The Treaty of Witr more – Mr. Bisaria writes that the River Water Participation Agreement – India has instead chose to block any data that exceeds the treaties of the treaty. A total of 48 bilateral agreements were reviewed for potential suspension. A meeting of all parties was held in Delhi, which led to a unanimous solution.

At the same time, the communication channels have been open-including the hotline between the general managers of military operations (DGMO), a major link to military communication to the military, in addition to both high commissions. In 2019, as now, Pakistan said the attack was a “Flag Flag”.

Like a lot this time A campaign in Kashmir witnessed the arrest of more than 80 “workers above the ground” – the local supporters who may have provided logistical, shelter and intelligence for militants from the Pakistan -based group. Rajnath Singh, then the Indian Interior Minister, visited Jumu and Kashmir, and files on the attack and the suspect perpetrators were prepared.

In a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sushma Swarraj, Mr. Bisaria told her that “India’s diplomatic options in dealing with a terrorist attack of this were limited.”

“She gave me the impression that some difficult measures were around the angle, and after that, I must expect diplomacy to be expanded,” Mr. Bisaria writes.

On February 26, the Indian air strikes – the first across the international border since 1971 – targeted the JEM training camp in Palacot.

Six hours later, the Indian Foreign Minister announced that the strikes had killed a “very large number” of militants and leaders. Pakistan quickly denied this claim. More high -level meetings followed in Delhi.

The crisis increased dramatically the next morning, February 27, when Pakistan fired reprisals.

In the following knowledge, an Indian fighter plane was shot down, and its pilot, the leader of the wing, Abenandan Verhamman, was expelled and landed in Kashmir, which was run by Pakistan. He seized the Pakistani forces, his detention in enemy lands led to a wave of national anxiety and increased tensions between nuclear armed neighbors.

Mr. Bisaria writes India activating multiple diplomatic channels, with United States and UK envoys pressing Islamabad. The Indian message was “any attempt by Pakistan to escalate the situation more or cause harm to the pilot that would lead to an escalation by India.”

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan announced the release of the pilot on February 28, with Delivery occurs on March 1 Under the Prisoner of the Prisoner of War. Pakistan made this step as a “good -intention” that aims to cancel the escalation tensions.

By March 5, with dust stabilizing from Poloa, Palmota, and the return of the pilot, the political temperature of India was cool. The Security Cabinet Committee decided to send the High Commissioner in India to Pakistan, indicating a shift towards diplomacy.

“I arrived in Islamabad on March 10, 22 days after she left in the aftermath of Poloama. The military exchange was notified since Cargill had managed its course in less than a month,” wrote Mr. Bisaria,

“India was ready to give an old diplomacy another chance …. However, India achieved a strategic and military goal, and Pakistan called the idea of ​​victory for its home audience.”

Mr. Bisaria described it as a “great test and time” to be diplomatic. This time, it is noted that the main difference is that the targets were Indian civilians, and that the attack occurred “from paradoxes, when the situation in Kashmir improved significantly.”

He sees an escalation as an inevitable matter, but he notes that there is also a “instinct to cancel the escalation alongside the escalation instinct.” When the Council of Ministers of Security (CCS) meets during such conflicts, he says, their decisions weigh the economic impact of the conflict and seek the measures that harm Pakistan without leading to a violent reaction against India.

He says: “The body language and optics are similar (this time),” but it highlights what it sees as a more important step: India’s threat to cancel the Indus Waters Treaty. “If India is working on it, it will have long -term severe consequences for Pakistan.”

“Remember, we are still in the middle of the crisis.” “We have not yet seen any movement (military).”