Crosses can tamper with train brakes using only radio

The CIS and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a consultant last week a warning that a major train system can be hacked using nothing but radio and small knowledge.

The defect is related to the protocol used in the train system known as the end of training and training head. The Fred background ending (Fred), also known as the EOOT, is attached to the back of the train and sends data via radio signals to a device against the locomotive “Head -f-TRAIN” (Hot). Orders can also be sent to Farid to the brake app at the back of the train.

These devices were installed for the first time in the eighties of the last century as an alternative to CAABOOSE cars, unfortunately, they lack encryption and ratification protocols. Instead, the current system uses the data packages sent between the front and back of the train, which includes a simple BCH examination to detect errors or overlap. But now, Cisa warns that someone uses a specific radio by programs can send fake data packages and interfere with train operations.

“The successful exploitation of this weakness can allow the attacker to send their brake control orders to the end of training, causing a sudden stop of the train, which may lead to disruption of operations, or stimulate brake failure,” Cisa wrote in her consultant.

Cisa enhances Nile Smith and Eric Reuters to report this vulnerability to the agency.

However, Smith wrote in a post on X (previously on Twitter) that he first alerted the ICS-CERT electronic monitoring team, which is now part of CISA, of risk in 2012 and no action was taken to address this issue at that time.

“So how bad this is? You can control a distance from the train brake unit from a very long distance, using devices that cost $ 500. You can stimulate the failure of the brake that leads to a decrease in the path, or you can turn off the entire national railway system. ” Smith wrote on x.

According to SMTH, there was a dead end between ICS-CERT and the American Railways Association (Aar) between 2012 and 2016. It claims that Aar found the theoretical risk and is required that it could actually happen in the real world before taking action.

In 2024, Smith filed the case again with the agency. Smith wrote on X that Aar still feels that the issue was not a big problem, but in April, the industry group announced that it will finally start The upgrade of the old system in 2026.

Chris Bottira represented the Assistant Executive Director of Cyber Security in any current risks caused by EOT weaknesses in an e -mail statement to Gizmodo.

“It has been understood and monitored by the end of the training (EOT) and the main weakness of the (hot) trainers by the stakeholders in the railway sector for more than a decade,” he wrote. “To exploit this issue, the representative of the threat requires material access to railways and knowledge of the deep protocol and specialized equipment, which limits the feasibility of wide exploitation – especially without a large and distributed in the United States.”

Bottira added that Cisa is working with industry partners on mitigation strategies and confirmed that reform is on the road.

Aar did not immediately respond to a request for comment from Gizmodo.