Try to log in Secure.telemessge.com Using a pair of these credentials and discovered that they have just hacked an e -mail address linked to customs protection and American border protection, which is one of the agencies that implement immigration policy in Trump. CBP has since then certain He was a distance agent.
After spending another few minutes in the drilling by emptying the pile, the infiltrator also discovered the regular text chat records. “I can read Coinbase’s internal chats, and this is incredible,” the infiltrator said. (Coinbase did not respond to WIRED’s request for comment, but he did Inform 404 Media that “there is no evidence of any Coinbase, or that any customer accounts are in danger, since Coinbase does not use this tool to share passwords, seed phrases or other data needed to access accounts.”
At this stage, the infiltrators say they spent 15 to 20 minutes of servers in Telemessge, and they have already been at risk as one of their clients in the federal government, along with one of the largest encrypted exchanges in the world.
I also discovered from Analysis TM SGNL source code, Telemessge applications – such as those that work on the Mike Waltz phone Archive.telemessge.com (I call this archive servant), which then redirects messages to the customer’s final destination. This contradicts the general marketing materials in Telemessge, where they claimed that TM SNGL uses “comprehensive encryption from mobile phone to corporate archive.”
The archive server is programmed in Java and is designed with Spring Boot, an open source frame for creating Java applications. Spring Boot includes a set of features called the operator that helps developers monitor and correct their applications. One of these features is Empty dumping pileIt is the URL title that the infiltrator uses to download the pile dumps.
According to the spring shoe operator Documents: “Since the end points may contain sensitive information, you should carefully consider the time of exposure.” In the case of Telemessge archive, the pile dumps contain users’ names, passwords, unsuccessful chat records, encryption switches and other sensitive information.
If anyone on the Internet downloads the URL to empty the pile, where Mike Waltz sent text messages using the TM SGNL application, the stomach discharge file would also include non -encrypted signal messages as well.
2024 mail On the Cloud Security Company Wiz Blog, the “Hepdump file” is included as the first common confirmation of the Spring Boot player. Until version 1.5 (which was released in 2017), the end of the ending point was formed as publicly exposed and accessible without approval by default. Since then, in subsequent publications, the spring boot operator changed its virtual formation to expose only /end -of -health points and /information without approval (this is less interesting to the attackers), “the author’s books. “Despite this improvement, developers often disable these security measures for diagnostic purposes when publishing applications on test environments, and this small change may remain apparently without anyone noticing, and thus continues when the application is pushed to production, allowing the attackers unintentionally to access non -banking access to important data.”
In 2020 mail On the Walmart Global Technology Blog, another developer gave a similar warning. “Regardless of /health and /information, all the ends of the operator are risky to open the final users because they can expose the application dumps, records, training data and control items,” the author wrote. “The end of the operator has security effects and should never be exposed to the production environment.”
The Hacker’s quick exploitation of Telemessge indicates that the archive server has been badly formed. Either managing an eight -year -old version of Spring Boot, or someone manually created it to expose the end of the heap on the public Internet.
That is why it took about 20 minutes of urging pirates before it opens, with a spill of sensitive data.
Despite this critical weakness and other security problems with Telemessge products – in particular, the Israeli company that builds products can reach all customer chat records in the normal text – a person in the Trump administration published on Mike Waltz while working as a national security teacher.
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