The foreign scene of British policy

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Rola Khaleda, FT editor, chooses her favorite stories in this weekly newsletter.

Yetz passed me, the old boy. “The center cannot carry”; “Everything has changed, completely changed.” The victory of Nigel Faraj in the United Kingdom won the local elections in English last week, and critics swore between the poetic exaggeration of those who see the end of politics as we knew it and discouraged the assignment of those who insist that things will likely return to the means.

Nobody can deny the disturbances. Since Britain has left the European Union, the UK policy has become more European. Support of the main limbs has withered. There is an unpopular and flawed opposition government. The voters were seduced in multiple directions, and above all, Britain captured its popular national strength.

The UK has witnessed multi -party moments before. But in the last general elections, joint support for employment and conservatives decreased from 82 percent in 2017 to only 57 percent. Last week, it was barely over a third. This looks like more than just.

It is too early to determine whether the modern results reflect a permanent change of political architecture or just a period of flow as the current judgment changes a personality – new facts or new furniture. But the main parties now have to work in a foreign scene, where the old certainty is eroded.

One of the famous cup is that we are witnessing the end of the policy consisting of the two -party dualism. Reform is the beating of conservatives while the Labor Party votes on the left. But while the rise of Varage threatens the current situation, it is not clear whether the British collapse, which lasted 100 years, is indifferent or in a transitional state of a prominent force on the right to another.

Certainly, the United Kingdom is witnessing the right (although reform challenges such an easy classification) about the immigration and ethical policy – a style similar to its lack in many Western countries. Conservatives had already moved greatly in this regard. Whether they are replaced by reform, restoring or ultimately agreed in the form of agreement, in one way or another, it is one dominant entity.

One of the differences is that, according to the personality of the Labor Party, “the opposition agenda is no longer determined by the official opposition.” For the first time in modern memory, the most vital opposition movement is largely outside Parliament, in the councils of provinces and the town and with discourse on social media. There was municipal opposition to the ketchup in the eighties, but under the umbrella of the wide work. There are positives and negatives for this for Farage. It will be difficult to control his new regional legacy that has the ability to overdo and embarrass him. However, this base outside London changes the nature of the discussion and adds to the feeling of exit from the outside, and a popular movement that challenges the institution. For this reason, reform is already setting the agenda of both main parties.

Then there is the changing effect of the first electoral system in the UK. This was traditionally like Blueck against the rebels, which is why reform had supported change. It hinders new parties: unless it is very effective in local targeting, they need to secure the share of approximately 30 percent before they enjoy a major parliamentary penetration. However, if one of the party is able to violate this high ceiling, the system suddenly operates in favor of it, which achieves hundreds of gains, and it is not impatient. Last week, the reform hit those levels.

The current electoral system is still being held against long -term multi -party policy. The new parties reflect a market gap. Then the founding parties work to bridge this gap, but it also changes the personality to do so. The work itself can find the same under pressure to protect the left wing as well.

Mobility in this new scene is more complicated by a greater strategic question. Historically, the elections are won by the occupation of the middle land. But the center turns. Many voters consider the Orthodox economy and progressive social policy have failed. Restore the right springs of this electoral transformation. Instead, the new medieval position is a mixture of social conservation, more left-wing economy and economics-as it becomes clear from the wide support for British steel nationalization.

This change raises two issues. The first is whether there is still the electoral area of ​​two main parties in the traditional prevailing center, or a strong left and right center, or if this area, as in many European Union, can now support only one major party.

The second is whether any of the two sides still wants this liberal center. Conservatives and reform have largely abandoned. If there is only one party for one party in this field, the Labor Party (somewhat supporting European, political, financially wise) is in a better position at the present time to work.

But the Labor Party is also chasing the reform of these voters. He defines the voic of the weak, not the Globalization Party, and is struggling to collect an alliance of successful liberals and less workers. It is also afraid to divide her voting to the left, especially vegetables. A large tent is not necessarily an advantage.

We can see the ways again to normal life (the collapse of reform, restoration of work, and the revival of conservatives). But the old strategic certainty melts. Part of the success of the reform so far is that it was faster to get to know the new electoral scene. Meanwhile, the two great two in Britain appear to be like tourists in a foreign country.

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